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Abstract
This paper reports estimates of the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to the net-of-tax rate for New Zealand taxpayers. The elasticity of taxable income
was estimated to be substantially higher for the highest income groups. Generally
it was higher for men than for women. Changes in the timing of income ﬂows
for the higher income recipients were found to be an important response to
the announcement of a new higher-rate bracket. The marginal welfare costs of
personal income taxation were consistent across years, being relatively small for
all but the higher tax brackets. For the top marginal rate bracket of 39 per cent,
the welfare cost of raising an extra dollar of tax revenue was estimated to be well
in excess of a dollar. Furthermore, for the top bracket the marginal tax rate was
often found to exceed the revenue-maximising tax rate.
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11 Introduction
This paper reports new estimates for New Zealand of the elasticity of taxable in-
come with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate. This elasticity aims to capture,
in a ‘reduced-form’ relationship, all potential responses to income taxation in a single
elasticity measure, without the need to specify the structural nature of the various
adjustment processes involved.1 These adjustments include, as well as labour supply
changes, income shifting between sources which are taxed at diﬀerent rates, and tax
evasion through non-declaration of income. The elasticity of taxable income has the
added attraction that, under certain assumptions, it can easily be used to obtain a
measure of the excess burden of income taxation.
The estimates are obtained using a special dataset, constructed using a random
sample of administrative data collected by the New Zealand Inland Revenue. The
details of the sample method and the variables obtained are provided in Appendix A.
The basic concept is introduced in Section 2, which describes the estimation meth-
ods used in later sections. Section 3 brieﬂy discusses the marginal rate structure of
New Zealand’s income tax system. This has remained relatively stable since the middle
1990s. A major change was made in 2001, when a new top marginal rate was intro-
duced. From 2001 until 2008, no threshold or marginal rate changes took place. Hence,
a policy change and the existence of ﬁscal drag provide two alternative approaches to
estimating the elasticity. Section 4 concentrates on estimates obtained by considering
the introduction of the 39 per cent rate, and Section 5 examines the implications of
ﬁscal drag, whereby some individuals experience a change in their marginal rate on
moving into a higher tax bracket. Brief comparisons with other estimates are made in
Section 6. The welfare eﬀects, arising from the tax distortion leading to the taxable
income responses, are considered in Section 7. Further background details regarding
welfare eﬀects for all tax brackets are given in Appendix B, and summary informa-
tion regarding the distribution of taxable income is contained in Appendix C. Brief
1The seminal contribution is by Feldstein (1995). The attraction of the measure is indicated by the
fact that a recent survey of estimates, by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009), includes 111 references.
For an introduction to the basic analytics, see Creedy (2009).
2conclusions are in Section 8.
2 The Elasticity and Estimation
The central concept examined here is the elasticity, , of declared income, ,w i t h







This elasticity captures all possible responses to tax rate changes in a single measure,
without attempting to model each form of response. A popular constant-elasticity
reduced-form speciﬁcation is the following:2
 = 0 (1 − )
 (2)
where 0 denotes the individual’s income in the absence of taxation (that is, when
 =0 ). The remainder of this section describes the alternative estimation methods
used in this paper.
Let  and 0 denote declared income of person  at time  and the income which
would be declared in the absence of taxation. Furthermore,  is the marginal tax rate
facing individual  at time ,e q u a lt o
()
 where  () is the tax function. Using the
constant elasticity form given above:
 = 0 (1 − )
 (3)
where by assumption the elasticity  is the same for all individuals in the relevant
population group considered.3
One approach is to consider actual policy changes in the tax structure for which
only a relatively small group of individuals are aﬀected, using information about the
2It can be shown that this follows from an assumption that utility takes the quasi-linear form










,w h e r e is disposable income. Thus income eﬀects of tax changes are
assumed to be zero.
3Given information about  and  for a group of individuals, a simple regression of log on
log(1 − ) and a constant, thereby omitting the unobservable 0, cannot be expected to provide a
useful estimate of , since the omitted variable is correlated with .
3distribution of taxable income before and after the policy change. For example, suppose
there is a change in only the top marginal income tax rate, which has no eﬀect on those
subject to lower rates. Let  denote the share of income of the aﬀected group at time
, and their average marginal tax rate at  is .L e t  =0and  =1denote pre-
and post-change periods. If the share of income in the relevant group would have
remained constant in the absence of the policy change, an estimate of ,d e n o t e dˆ ,
can be obtained using:
ˆ  =
log1 − log0
log(1 − 1) − log(1 − 0)
(4)
This method requires only summary data relating to the (cross-sectional) taxable in-
come distribution in two periods.
An alternative approach to a policy change involves using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
framework with panel data. However, the ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ groups cannot
be identiﬁed in the usual way since in the present context they are deﬁned by in-
come. Suppose that the treatment group, , comprises the top 1 percentile of the
income distribution and the control group, , is made up of individuals in the next 2
percentile. Being in the treatment group clearly depends on the behaviour and char-
acteristics of taxpayers. Again, suppose tax policy changes from period 0 to period 1,
and let  () denote the respective sample average. The appropriate diﬀerence between
groups in the diﬀerences between average log-taxable income from one period to the
next, denoted ∆log,i sg i v e nb y :
∆log = { (log1|) −  (log0|)}−{ (log1|) −  (log0|)} (5)
The diﬀerence between groups in the diﬀerences between the logarithm of average
net-of-tax rates from one period to the next, denoted ∆log(1 − ),i sg i v e nb y :
∆log(1 − )={ (log(1− 1)|) −  (log(1− 0)|)}
−{ (log(1− 1)|) −  (log(1− 0)|)} (6)





4Again, this approach involves an assumption that without the policy change the in-
c o m e so ft h et w og r o u p sw o u l dh a v eg r o w na tt h es a m er a t e . 4 In addition, the elasticity
of taxable income is assumed to be the same for both groups.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach can also be applied in situations where there
is no explicit policy change aﬀecting the marginal tax rate faced by some individuals.
In particular, ﬁscal drag gives rise to a general increase in average tax rates but it can
also shift some individuals into the next bracket and thus subject them to a higher
marginal rate. Such individuals are regarded as being in the ‘treatment’ group. Those
in the lower section of an income range do not face a higher marginal rate, as they do
not cross a threshold, and are regarded as being in the ‘control’ group. The expression
for ˆ  can thus be used in this context. This method can be applied for each tax bracket,
thereby allowing for variations in  with income (between brackets).5
3 New Zealand’s Income Tax System
As mentioned earlier, the relative stability of the personal income tax structure, in
terms of marginal rates and thresholds, provides helpful conditions for attempting to
estimate the elasticity of taxable income. This section brieﬂy discusses New Zealand’s
income tax system.
New Zealand’s income tax system was transformed with economic reforms that be-
gan in 1984. These reforms were designed to improve eﬃciency while raising revenue
by broadening the tax base and lowering marginal income tax rates; see, for example,
Evans et al. (1996). The tax base was broadened by introducing a comprehensive
goods and services tax (GST) and a fringe beneﬁt tax, and by eliminating many tax
concessions, exemptions and investment and export incentives. The top personal mar-
4If systematic income changes occur for non-tax reasons, for example if there is some ‘regression
towards the mean’ over time, the estimator may be biased. A method of allowing for such changes is
examined by Creedy (2009).
5In addition to income tax thresholds, the real value of other tax parameters (such as allowance
and deduction limits) can fall during inﬂation, as examined by Onrubia and Sanz (2009). However,

























Figure 1: Eﬀective Tax Rates 1994 to 1999
ginal income tax rate was cut from 66 per cent to 33 per cent and the number of
tax brackets was reduced from eleven to three. The company tax rate was lowered
from 48 per cent to 33 per cent. Aggregate tax revenue actually increased despite the
reductions in the tax rates.
The tax scales for 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008 are plotted in Figures 1 and 2.
The ‘composite’ years, 1997 and 1999, are years when a tax rate or income threshold
change came into eﬀect during the income tax year, which starts on 1 April and ends
on 31 March.
New Zealand’s broad based, low rate personal income tax system introduced dur-
ing the economic reforms remained virtually unchanged until 2001, although during
1994 to 2001 the middle income tax bracket was subject to some threshold and rate
adjustments. However, in 2001 a new top personal marginal tax rate of 39 per cent for
income above $60,000 was introduced, with the company and trust rates remaining at
33 per cent.6 This policy change provides a useful natural experiment for studying the
responsiveness of taxpayers to changes in marginal tax rates.




















Figure 2: Eﬀective Tax Rates 2000 to 2008
Furthermore, over the period 2001 to 2008 no threshold or rate changes were made
to the other tax brackets.7 As a result of income growth, with thresholds being ﬁxed in
nominal terms, a large number of taxpayers experienced an increase in their marginal
rate because they moved into a higher tax bracket. These ﬁscal drag eﬀects enable the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator discussed in the previous section to be used.
4 Empirical Results: Introduction of 39 Per cent
Rate
This section presents estimates of taxpayers’ responses to changes in marginal tax rates,
following the introduction of the 39 per cent top personal marginal rate. Elasticities of
taxable income are reported for all taxpayers and for females and males separately. The
ﬁrst set of estimates are obtained using equation (4), calculated for diﬀerent taxpayer
7Changes to the Working for Families (WfF) package began in October 2004 and were implemented
in stages through 1 April 2007. They included changes to in-work incentives and family entitlement
and support to meet childcare and accommodation costs. Low- to middle-income families were the
key target group for these changes.
7g r o u p s .I tu s e st h es h a r eo ft a x a b l ei n c o m eb e f o r et h et a xr a t ec h a n g ea sap r o x yf o r
the share of taxable income after the tax rate change, had the tax rate change not
taken place. The method compares the share of taxable income before and after the
policy change and attributes any change in the shares of taxable income to the tax rate
change. The second set of estimates of the elasticity are based on the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimate, given by equation (7). This method compares changes in average
taxable income, before and after the policy change, of taxpayers who experienced a
rate change and those who did not.
4.1 Income Shares and Average Marginal Rates
First, information about the average rates faced by diﬀerent groups is summarised in
Figures 3 to 5. These diagrams plot the average marginal tax rates faced by the top
decile, the ninth decile and the combined eighth and seventh deciles (the fourth quintile)
of income earners, along with their shares of taxable income from 1994 to 2008. Figure
3 shows that between 1994 and 2000 all top decile income earners faced a marginal
tax rate of 33 per cent. Over this period their share of taxable income increased from
33.7 per cent in 1994 to 36 per cent in 1999. Following the announcement of the 39
per cent top personal rate for income above $60,000 the top decile’s share of taxable
income rose sharply to 38.9 per cent in 2000. However, following the introduction of
the 39 per cent rate it fell to 33.9 per cent in 2001. Between 2001 and 2008 the share
of taxable income obtained by the top decile ﬂuctuated between 33.7 per cent in 2008
and 34.6 per cent in 2005. The introduction of the 39 per cent rate led to an increase
in the average marginal tax rate of the top decile. By 2006 all top decile earners faced
the new top marginal rate of 39 per cent.
F i g u r e4s h o w st h a to v e rt h ep e r i o d1 9 9 4t o2 0 0 8t h o s ei nt h en i n t hd e c i l eo ft a x a b l e
income contributed, on average, 17.3 per cent to the personal income tax base. Their
marginal tax rate averaged 33 per cent from 1994 to 1998 and 2002 to 2006. Between
1999 and 2001 it fell below 33 per cent for three years following a threshold and a tax
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Share of taxable income (LHS) Average marginal tax rate (RHS)
Figure 5: Combined Seventh and Eighth Decile Income Share and Average Marginal
Tax Rate
cent in 2007 and 34.9 per cent in 2008 as the number of taxpayers who moved into the
top tax bracket increased.
Figure 5 shows that between 1994 and 1996 the average marginal tax rate of the
seventh and eighth deciles of taxable income was around 31 per cent. However, it fell
sharply to reach a low of 26.1 per cent in 2000 due to various threshold and tax rate
adjustments. Since 2001 it has been rising steadily to reach 34 per cent in 2008. Over
the period 2000 to 2008 these income earners experienced a slightly larger increase in
their average marginal tax rate than the top decile of income earners (7.8 percentage
points compared with 6 percentage points). But, in contrast to the top decile earners
whose share of taxable income fell, their contribution to the personal income tax base
rose slightly. It averaged 30.3 per cent between 1994 and 2000 and 31.1 per cent
between 2001 and 2008.
104.2 Elasticity Estimates
The elasticities of taxable income, which compare the share of taxable income before
and after the introduction of the 39 per cent rate, are reported in Table 1 for the
top decile of taxable income earners. Two years are considered before the rate change.
They are 1999, which pre-dates the announcement of the 39 per cent top rate and 2000,
which is the year before its introduction. The elasticities are calculated for two base
y e a r sb e c a u s eo ft h es h a r pi n c r e a s ei nt h et o pd e c i l e ’ st a x a b l ei n c o m et h a to c c u r r e d
in 2000. Values for the ninth decile and combined seventh and eighth deciles are not
reported in detail here as they were all found to be zero when using 1999 as the base
year, and 0.1 when using 2000 as base year.
Table 1 reports elasticities for the top decile of between 0.4 and 1 using 1999 values
as the income share before the rate change. The elasticities are substantially higher
when 2000 is used as the base year for comparison, suggesting that a 1 per cent increase
in the net-of-tax rate raises taxable income by 1.3 to 2.3 per cent. These values are
unrealistically high, and clearly arise from the anticipation of the marginal rate increase.
Hence the knowledge that a new top tax bracket is due to be introduced leads to a
change in the timing of income ﬂows, particularly for high income earners. This timing
change is clearly reﬂected in Figure 3.
Table 1: Elasticity of Taxable Income in Top Decile: Introduction of 39 per cent
Marginal Rate
Compared with:





























Share of taxable income (LHS) Average marginal tax rate (RHS)
Figure 6: Top Percentile Income Share and Average Marginal Tax Rate
clearly more responsive to tax rate changes than lower income earners. In fact, the
response of the top decile income earners is largely due to the highest earners in this
group. This is illustrated by Figures 6 and 7, which plot the average marginal tax rate
faced by the top percentile and the 90-99th percentiles of taxable income earners, along
with their shares of taxable income from 1994 to 2008. Both taxpayer groups experi-
e n c e da ni n c r e a s ei nt h e i rm a r g i n a lt a xr a t e . T h es h a r eo ft a x a b l ei n c o m er e m a i n e d
virtually unchanged for the 90-99th percentiles. However, for the top percentile, it rose
sharply in 2000, the year before the introduction of the 39 per cent rate, and then fell.
Between 1994 and 2000 the top percentile of income earners contributed on average
10.2 per cent of personal income tax revenue compared with 9.3 per cent between 2001
and 2008.
Figure 8 shows that the sharp increase in taxable income of the top percentile of
income earners in 2000 was due to a rise in dividend income during that year. Under
New Zealand’s imputation system, credits are attached to dividends for income tax that
has been paid at the company level. The introduction of the 39 per cent top personal




















Share of taxable income (LHS) Average marginal tax rate (RHS)
Figure 7: 90-99th Percentile Income Share and Average Marginal Tax Rate
cent tax liability for earners with income above $60,000. As a result, companies paid
out large proﬁts before the 39 per cent top personal rate came into eﬀect. Figure 8 also
shows a decline in shareholder salaries following the introduction of the 39 per cent top
marginal rate.
Table 2 reports the elasticities of taxablei n c o m ef o rt h et o pp e r c e n t i l eo ft a x a b l e
income earners compared with 1999 and 2000. The elasticities of the top percentile of
income earners are higher than those of the top decile earners. Values for the 90-99th
percentile were found to be negligible, suggesting that most of the response of the top
decile income earners is due to the top percentile earners. Again the values using 2000
as the base year are unrealistically high as a result of the bringing forward of taxable
income between the announcement of the policy change and its implementation.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator of the elasticity of taxable income is reported
in Table 3. It is the elasticity of taxable income for the top decile of income earners
compared with the next decile.8 The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator produces similar
8Due to the ﬂat income tax scales in New Zealand the top percentile versus the 90-99 percentile
of earners could not be calculated. This is because the 90-99 percentile of earners is not a meaningful
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Other Average marginal tax rate
Figure 8: Top Percentile Income Share and Composition and Average Marginal Tax
Rate
Table 2: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Top Percentile of Incomes
Compared with:









14orders of magnitude compared with the taxable income share elasticity for the top decile
of taxable income earners.
Table 3: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Elasticity of Taxable Income: Top Decile versus
Nineth Decile of Incomes
Compared with:










It is also of interest to investigate whether females and males respond diﬀerently to
marginal tax rate changes. Tables 4 and 5 report elasticities of taxable income for the
top decile and for the top percentile of income earners.9 Values for lower deciles are
negligible, as are the values for the 90-99th percentiles, and are thus not reported. The
results conﬁrm the previous ﬁnding that higher income earners are more responsive to
marginal tax rate changes than lower income earners for both females and males. The
elasticity estimates for the top percentile income earners exceeds that of the top decile.
Moreover, the results suggest that men may be more responsive than women to tax
rate changes, when 1999 is used as the base year, thereby avoiding the income shifting
between periods, discussed above. Women are likely to be less responsive to tax rate
changes than men because they have lower incomes. This can be seen in Figure 9,
which plots the average income of the top decile female and male earners for 1994 to
2008. The average income of the top decile female earners rose steadily from $48,983
in 1994 to $83,237 in 2008. By comparison, the top decile of male incomes increased
them, faced the same marginal tax rate as the top percentile of earners.
9Elasticities of the top decile compared with the ninth decile are not reported here, because the
relatively higher increase in incomes of females in the ninth decile impart a large downward bias.
Values for males steadily increase from 0.8 in 2001 to 1.8 in 2007, when 1999 is the base year.
15Table 4: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Top Decile of Incomes
Compared with:
1999 (Pre-announcement) 2000 (Pre-introduction)
Female Male Female Male
Top Decile Incomes
2001 0.6 0.9 2.7 1.9
2002 0.2 0.7 2.0 1.7
2003 0.5 0.8 2.2 1.8
2004 0.3 0.6 1.7 1.5
2005 0.2 0.5 1.4 1.4
2006 -0.2 0.8 0.8 1.8
2007 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.8
2008 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.8
Table 5: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Top Percentile of Incomes
Compared with:
1999 (Pre-announcement) 2000 (Pre-introduction)
Female Male Female Male
Top Percentile Incomes
2001 1.5 2.5 4.0 5.6
2002 1.2 1.8 3.7 4.8
2003 1.0 1.8 3.6 4.9
2004 1.0 0.6 3.5 3.7
2005 0.7 0.0 3.2 3.0
2006 -0.4 2.0 2.1 5.0
2007 0.6 2.0 3.1 5.1
2008 1.2 1.8 3.7 4.9
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Females Males
Figure 9: Average Incomes of Top Decile of Female and Male Earners
from $85,070 to $135,501. Also notable is thei n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g et a x a b l ei n c o m e
of male earners from $110,299 in 1999 to $129,338 in 2000 and the drop in 2001 to
$100,997.
5 Empirical Results: Fiscal Drag
This section reports estimates of taxpayers’ responsiveness to changes in marginal tax
rates by examining the behaviour of earners, whose marginal tax rate increased because
they moved into a higher tax bracket as a result of ﬁscal drag. The period 2001 to
2008 is considered, as during this time no threshold or marginal rate changes were
made to the lower income tax brackets. Elasticities of taxable income are derived for
all taxpayers and for females and males separately.
The eﬀects of ﬁscal drag can be examined by using the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence es-
timator in (7). In previous studies this has, for example, been used by taking as the
control group those individuals within a tax bracket who remain in the same bracket
from one period to the next, despite a general upward movement in incomes. The treat-
17ment group consists of those who were in the same tax bracket but moved into a higher
bracket and thus experience an increase in their marginal tax rate. The denominator
of (7), as a proportionate diﬀerence in net-of-tax rates, is negative. The numerator
is expected also to be negative, since those people moving into a higher tax bracket
(consisting mainly of those who were near the top of the initial tax bracket), are likely
to respond to the higher tax rate by modifying the increase in their declared taxable
income. This situation arises where all those in the tax bracket would experience sim-
ilar rates of income growth over the time period, if there were no tax consequences.
Thus it is assumed that there are no systematic non-tax-related income changes.
However, in the present context, it was found that there are signiﬁcant variations
in income movements. For example, there are many individuals who move from the
second highest tax bracket, often into a lower tax bracket, while others move into the
highest income range. This type of income dynamics produces a substantial bias if (7)
is directly applied. Hence the following approach was used instead.
T h ec a l c u l a t i o n sa r eb a s e do np e o p l ew h ow e r ei nt h es a m et a xb r a c k e ti np e r i o d,
where some of those taxpayers moved into a higher income tax bracket in period +1.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence elasticity compares the change in taxable income of these
income recipients between periods  +1and  +2 . Taxable income may have changed
because taxpayers adjusted how much they work or save, because of tax planning or
because they exited paid market employment or emigrated from New Zealand and
hence dropped out of the sample.
The elasticities of earners who moved into the top bracket and of taxpayers who
moved into the second highest tax bracket are reported in Table 6. The results conﬁrm
earlier ﬁn d i n g st h a th i g h e ri n c o m ee a r n e r sa r em o r er e s p o n s i v et h a nl o w e ri n c o m e
taxpayers. The elasticities of people who moved into the top bracket are higher than
those of taxpayers who moved into the second highest tax bracket. But the elasticities
of earners who moved into the top bracket are lower than those of the top decile of
earners reported in Table 3.
Consider next the question of whether higher and lower income earners respond
diﬀerently at the intensive and extensive margin to changes in their marginal tax
18Table 6: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Earners Moving into the Top and the Second
Highest Bracket
Earners Moving into the:








rates. International evidence suggests that higher income earners tend to respond at
the intensive margin; that is they adjust their taxable income by changing work eﬀort,
hours worked, the amount they save, and so on. However, lower income earners and
secondary earners tend to respond at the extensive margin; that is, they often leave or
enter the labour market in response to an increase or decrease in their marginal tax
rate.
Figure 10 plots the elasticities of taxable income of all earners who moved into
the top tax bracket and the elasticities of earners who moved into the top bracket
but excluding taxpayers who exited the sample. The ﬁgure shows that overall the
elasticities are similar; that is, people do not seem to exit paid market employment
when they move into the top tax bracket.
However, a diﬀerent picture emerges for lower income taxpayers. Figure 11 plots
the elasticities of taxable income of all earners who moved into the second highest
bracket and the corresponding elasticities, excluding taxpayers who exited the sample.
It shows that the values obtained by excluding taxpayers who exited the sample are
consistently higher than those for all income recipients. This ﬁnding suggests, in line
with international evidence, that lower income taxpayers who experience an increase
in their marginal tax rate are more likely to exit paid market employment than higher
income earners whose marginal tax rate increases.
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Elasticity of taxable income of all earners Elasticity of taxable income excluding earners who exited the sample
Figure 10: Revenue Elasticity of Earners Moving into the Top Bracket — All Earners









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Elasticity of taxable income of all earners Elasticity of taxable income excluding earners who exited the sample
Figure 11: Revenue Elasticity of Earners Moving into the Second Highest Bracket —
All Earners and Excluding Those Who Exited the Sample
20cause they moved into the top tax bracket, are summarised in Table 7 for all taxpayers
and excluding those who exited the sample. Once again, male earners tend to have
higher elasticities than female earners. But neither men nor women appear to be more
l i k e l yt oe x i tp a i dm a r k e te m p l o y m e n to re m i g r a t ef r o mN e wZ e a l a n dw h e nm o v i n g
into the top bracket.
At lower incomes, however, women appear to be more responsive to changes in
their marginal tax rates than men both at the intensive and extensive margin. This is
shown in Table 8, which reports the elasticities of taxable income of female and male
earners who moved into the second highest tax bracket for all earners and excluding
taxpayers who left the sample. Both elasticities are higher for women than men in
all years except for 2008 when the elasticity excluding people who left the sample was
higher for male earners compared with female earners. The downward bias resulting
from not excluding those who left the sample is clear, especially for men in this bracket.
Table 7: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Earners Moving into the Top Bracket
Including all earners Excluding those who
left the Sample
Female Male Female Male
2002 -0.5 1.1 0.8 1.1
2003 2.2 1.5 1.6 1.4
2004 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.2
2005 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.0
2006 1.4 0.6 1.2 0.8
2007 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.9
2008 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8
6 Some Comparisons
Many empirical estimates of the elasticity of taxable income have been produced for a
large range of countries, as discussed by, for example, Saez et al. (2009). The values
vary considerably, depending on the method of estimation used, the particular reform
examined, and the country. After mentioning that a number of authors suggest a
21Table 8: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Earners Moving into the Second Highest Bracket
Including all earners Excluding those who
left the sample
Female Male Female Male
2002 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.1
2003 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.3
2004 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2
2005 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
2006 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.1
2007 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2
2008 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3
‘consensus value of about 0.4’, Giertz (2004, pp. 14, 37) warns that this ‘masks con-
siderable variation in the estimates’. Indeed, there is no reason to expect the elasticity
to remain unchanged over time, or to be similar across countries having diﬀerent tax
structures and regulations. Furthermore, the above results have demonstrated some
heterogeneity among types of taxpayer, so that there seems little value in attempting
to ﬁnd a consensus value.
Another feature of many estimates is that much uncertainty is attached to them,
in that they have wide conﬁdence intervals. After reviewing elasticities, Meghir and
Richards (2007, p. 19) comment that ‘the estimates of the eﬀect of taxes on taxable
income, whose purpose is to identify the impact of taxation on other dimensions of
eﬀort, should be regarded with caution’. Furthermore, Saez et al. (2009, p. 59) suggest
that, ‘there are no convincing estimates of the long-run elasticity’. The suggestion, by
Saez et al. (2009) that some ‘short run’ elasticity estimates obtained from tax reforms
may perhaps capture changes in the timing of declarations, has been conﬁrmed by the
above analysis of the introduction of the 39 per cent tax rate in New Zealand.
The use of a ‘reduced form’ speciﬁcation inevitably carries with it the diﬃculty
that, when a parameter estimate is found to change from one dataset to another, there
is no way of knowing precisely what has caused the change. It has been demonstrated
above that examination of the various income components is important, particularly
among the higher income taxpayers. Giertz (2004, p. 39) suggested that, ‘much work
22is still needed in order to better understand the process by which incomes respond to
changes’. This judgement was repeated by Saez et al. (2009) who stressed the need to
look at the various margins involved in responses to taxation. The value of examining
the diﬀerent margins was indeed demonstrated in the previous section.
Where it has been possible to estimate elasticities for diﬀerent income ranges, a
common result is that they vary with income, being higher for higher incomes. This
result has been conﬁrmed by the present analysis, and it is perhaps not surprising in
view of the fact that higher income groups may be expected to have more opportunities
to shift income between sources.
Faced with the diﬃculty of obtaining data in New Zealand, there is only one pre-
vious study containing estimates of the elasticity of taxable income for New Zealand.
Using a variety of methods, covering a number of tax structure changes, Thomas (2007,
p. 22) obtained estimates which ‘ranged from 0.35 to 1.10, with a preferred estimate of
0.52’; see also Thomas (2007, p. 18). The present results are thus broadly in line with
those reported by Thomas. He found that the tax rate reductions in the mid-1980s
produced substantial reductions in the excess burden from income taxation. Similarly,
the increase in the top marginal rate in 2001 again raised excess burdens, though to
levels below those of the 1980s. He reported marginal welfare costs of as high as $8
per extra dollar of revenue raised. The following Section truns to the measurement of
such welfare costs.
7M a r g i n a l W e l f a r e C o s t s
This section considers the eﬃciency costs of personal income taxation. Subsection 7.1
shows how marginal welfare costs of the top marginal tax rate can be obtained using
the elasticity of taxable income concept, under a range of assumptions, in particular
the absence of income eﬀects. Appendix B extends the method to deal with all tax
brackets and also provides information about the relevant income distribution terms
and other components required for obtaining the marginal welfare cost. Subsection 7.2
reports empirical results.
237.1 Revenue and Welfare Eﬀects of the Top Marginal Rate
This subsection considers the eﬃciency eﬀects of changes in the top marginal income
tax rate in a multi-rate system. This has received most attention in the literature and
is the policy change considered in Section 4. Suppose income above the threshold, ,
is taxed at the ﬁxed rate, . If this is the top marginal rate, so that there are no income
thresholds above , the tax paid at that rate by an individual is given, for   ,




( − )= (¯  − ) (8)
where ¯  is the arithmetic mean of those above the threshold, and  is the number
of people whose taxable income is above the threshold. It is important to recognise
that  ( − ) is not the total tax paid by person , since the latter has to include tax
paid at lower rates. However, changes in the top rate are of course expected to have
no eﬀect on revenue from the lower rates.












The ﬁrst term is a pure ‘tax rate’ eﬀect while the second term is a ‘tax base’ eﬀect of
the tax rate change. Using

 =  (¯  − ),






1−, the revenue change becomes:10













Let  (),  () and 1 ()=
 
0 ()  ∞
0 () denote the density function, the distribution
function and the ﬁrst moment distribution function of . The Lorenz curve is, for
example, the relationship between  () and 1 (), the proportion of people associated
with a proportion of total income (cumulating from lowest to highest). In general it
can be shown that:
¯ 






´ 1 −  ()
1 − 1 ()
¸−1
(11)
10This is equivalent to the result stated by Saez et al. (2009, p. 5, equation 5).
24where ¯  is the arithmetic mean of the complete distribution of .D e ﬁne:
 =
¯ 
¯  − 
(12)
so that (10) is more succinctly written as:










The tax rate, ∗, which maximises revenue from the top marginal rate, obtained by
setting





The revenue change in (10) depends on the precise form of the distribution of declared
income and the income threshold above which the tax rate of  applies. The various
components of (11) can be obtained from information about the distribution of declared
incomes.
The marginal welfare cost, ,d e ﬁned as the marginal excess burden divided
by the change in tax revenue, is:11
 =

1 −  − 
(15)
This expression is relevant only when the marginal tax rate is below the revenue-
maximising rate in (14), so that

  0.12 The extension to cover all tax brackets is
given in Appendix B.
7.2 Empirical Results
The results of the previous section, along with Appendix B, enable the marginal welfare
cost to be evaluated for any tax bracket, given cross-sectional information about the
11Saez et al. (2009, p. 6) call the  the ‘marginal eﬃciency cost of funds (MECF)’. However,
the ‘marginal cost of funds’, or , is usually deﬁned as 1+. On these concepts, see Creedy
(1998, pp. 54-59).
12Suppose a proportion, , of the reduction in declared income attracts a tax rate of .S a e zet
al. (2009, p. 9) show that 










is relevant only for parameter values for which 
  0, that is for values of  which are less than ∗,
given by ∗ =
1+
1+ ,a n dw h i c hi sh i g h e rt h a ni n( 1 4 ) .
25distribution of taxable income and the relevant value of the elasticity of taxable income.
Earlier results have produced a range of values for the elasticity, with lower values in
lower income groups and for women compared with men (with the exception of the
ﬁscal drag results for movement into the second highest tax bracket). For this reason
computations were carried out for a range of values of  in each tax bracket, thereby
also enabling the sensitivity of welfare changes to  to be examined.
Tables 9 and 10 report the marginal welfare costs for each year and tax bracket, for
four alternative values of . A dash in any cell of the table indicates that the tax rate
exceeds the revenue-maximising rate for that tax bracket. This occurs in a substantial
number of cases, particularly for the top marginal rate groups and the higher elasticity
values. The estimates reported above are indeed in those higher ranges. As expected
the marginal welfare costs for the lower elasticity values and the lower tax brackets
are relatively small, while for the top tax bracket they are large — mostly in excess of
unity.13 Thus for those top brackets, when the tax rate is below the revenue-maximising
value, the welfare cost of raising an extra dollar of revenue is well in excess of a dollar.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the welfare costs for the top marginal rate bracket
increase substantially after the introduction of the 39 per cent top tax rate. To the
extent that a proportion of taxable income is being diverted into other sources which
attract lower tax rates, the above estimates overstate the marginal welfare costs, as
discussed in footnote 12 above. Insuﬃcient information is available, about the diverted
proportions and associated rates, on which to base an adjustment here.
It is known that the marginal welfare costs can be highly sensitive with respect
to the elasticity of taxable income. However, the values reported in these two tables
are relatively stable in the lower and middle tax brackets, becoming more sensitive for
the higher marginal rates. For the lower tax brackets, where the rates and thresholds
remain stable, the welfare costs change very little over time, reﬂecting the relative
stability in the distribution of taxable incomes.
13Higher welfare costs for individuals in Australia were found by Creedy et al. (2008), using a
structural labour supply model, even though labour supply changes were small. The assumption of
zero income eﬀects which is imposed in the present analysis may thus aﬀect results.
26Table 9: Marginal Welfare Costs
Threshold  =0 5  =0 7  =0 9  =1 1
1994
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 60 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.28 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.47
30875 0.33 1.51 5.3 - -
1995
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 60 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.49
30875 0.33 1.37 4.27 - -
1996
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 60 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.38 0.5
30875 0.33 1.36 4.18 - -
1997
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 50 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.33 0.44
30876 0.2625 - - - -
34200 0.33 1.4 4.47 - -
1998
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 50 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.24 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.38
34200 0.33 1.36 4.18 - -
1999
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 50 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.2175 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.32
34201 0.24 0 0 0 0
38000 0.33 1.27 3.6 0 0
2000
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 60 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.21 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.29
38000 0.33 1.03 2.45 10.52 -
2001
0 0 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 0 50 . 0 70 . 0 9
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 4.32 - - -
27Table 10: Marginal Welfare Costs
Threshold  =0 5  =0 7  =0 9  =1 1
2002
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.28
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 3.83 - - -
2003
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.28
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 3.98 - - -
2004
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.28
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 3.55 - - -
2005
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.28
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 3.3 - - -
2006
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 3.9 - - -
2007
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 4.14 - - -
2008
0 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
9501 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27
38001 0.33 - - - -
60000 0.39 4.14 - - -
288C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has provided estimates for New Zealand of the concept of the elasticity of
taxable income, with respect to changes in the net-of-tax marginal tax rate. This con-
cept has the advantage of measuring, in a reduced-form context, all possible responses
to tax rate changes and of enabling the eﬃciency eﬀects to be measured. Results were
obtained using a special dataset constructed from a random sample of New Zealand
taxpayers.
Two approaches were used to estimate elasticity values for diﬀerent groups of tax-
payers. First, the introduction of an additional top marginal tax rate bracket provided
a useful policy change as a natural experiment. Secondly, the stability of the tax struc-
ture over recent years enables the eﬀect of ﬁscal drag, in shifting some individuals into
a higher marginal tax rate bracket, to be considered. In using the ﬁrst approach, it
was particularly important to consider the possibility that some observed responses to
tax changes may involve the timing, rather than the total amount, of taxable income
declared, particularly in anticipation of announced changes taking eﬀect. Furthermore,
in estimating the elasticity, care needs to be taken to avoid attributing some of the
changes in declared income to marginal tax changes, when they may have arisen from
other dynamic factors. Non-tax-related income movements were observed, particularly
when attempting to base estimates on tax rate changes arising from ﬁscal drag and the
movement into higher tax brackets.
In view of these complications, the results should be treated with caution. Never-
theless, it was found that the elasticity of taxable income is substantially higher for
the highest income groups. Indeed for lower deciles of the income distribution, the
elasticity was found to be negligible. Generally the elasticity was higher for men than
for women. This may be largely because the taxable incomes of men are systemat-
ically above those of women. Changes in the timing of income ﬂows for the higher
income recipients was found to be an important response to the announcement of a
new higher-rate bracket. The marginal welfare costs of personal income taxation were
consistent across years, being relatively small for all but the higher tax brackets. For
29the top marginal rate bracket of 39 per cent, the welfare cost of raising an extra dollar
of tax revenue was found to be well in excess of a dollar. Furthermore, for the top
bracket the marginal tax rate was often found to exceed the revenue-maximising tax
rate, for appropriate values of the elasticity of taxable income.
30Appendix A: The Data
This appendix describes the data used in the analysis. The database was constructed
by randomly sampling Inland Revenue’s individual taxpayer population. It covers
the period from 1994 to 2008. The random sample is weighted to match the total
population. The database includes people with wage/salary income (including taxable
welfare beneﬁts) and people who ﬁled an IR5 or IR3 tax return or received a personal
tax summary (PTS). It excludes people with no personal taxable income unless they
ﬁled.
The requirement for wage and salary earners to ﬁle an IR5 tax return was in part
based on earnings over a threshold. This threshold was eased during the 1990s from
$20,000 in the early 1990s, to $38,000 by 1999. However a signiﬁcant administrative
change in 2000 removed the IR5 tax return entirely and replaced it with the PTS,
a pre-populated taxpayer square-up based on data collected from employers during
the year. The income threshold was removed, with a consequential reduction in the
number of taxpayers required to square-up. This has caused a structural break in
the income tax data collected, especially on dividend and interest income. Taxpayers
who previously ﬁl e da nI R 5w e r en o tr e q u i r e dt os q u a r eu pv i aaP T Si ft h e i ro n l y
income was from salary and wages or from investments with the correct amount of tax
deducted at source, or where the investment income was below a certain threshold.
Individual taxpayer information is gathered from the following sources/returns:
1. Client registration
2. Individual tax return IR3
3. Personal tax summary (PTS) from 2000 onwards
4. Salary/wage earner income tax return IR5 (pre-PTS) from 1994 to 1999
5. Employer monthly schedule (EMS) from 2000 onwards
6. Annual tax deduction certiﬁcate (TDC) from 1994 to 1999
31Sampling method Taxpayers are broadly categorised into two groups based on a
taxpayer’s ‘entity class’; a client registration feature: (a) salary/wage earner with a
salary/wage (SW) entity class; and (b) other taxpayers with a non-SW entity class (for
example, self-employed or salary/wage earners with other income from rental properties
or overseas investments). The selection method is as follows:
1. A random two per cent of total salary/wage earners — with the random sample
selected from the last two digits of their IRD number;
2. A random ten per cent of total other individual taxpayers — also based on the
last two digits of the IRD number with the chosen range including the two per
cent sample above.
A taxpayer generally has one IRD number and the same entity class. However,
a minority of taxpayers could have a second IRD number due to bankruptcy or they
might retain the same IRD number but change entity class over time. This means that
the above selection method will have some ‘missing’ taxpayers if a taxpayer has an
entity class change from non-SW to SW, or a taxpayer is issued a new IRD number
because of bankruptcy.
Variables The dataset contains the following main variables:
1. General variables — unique IRD number, date of birth, gender
2. Income variables — salary/wage earning, business income, estate or trust beneﬁ-
ciary income, interest income, dividend income, overseas income, rental income,
shareholder-employee salary, partnership income, other income, taxable income
3. Other variables — expenses, losses claimed, loss attributing qualifying company
(LAQC) losses claimed
The gender variable is determined based on the ‘title’ of a taxpayer (e.g. Mr and
Miss) so some imputation is required. When no title is present, or the title is ambiguous,
gender is randomly assigned.
32Some of the variables are unique to IR3 ﬁlers and not available for non-ﬁlers. Dif-
ferences in the return ﬁnancial variables are summarised in Table 11:
Table 11: Income Variables
IR3 PTS/IR5 Non ﬁler TDC/EMS
Salary/wage income Salary/wage income Salary/wage earning
Interest income Interest income
Dividend income Dividend income
Business income










Taxable income is the sum of all incomes less LAQC losses claimed, less expenses
and less losses claimed (in that order). Taxable income is zero if a taxpayer has negative
taxable income (i.e. a loss). As the focus is on income, rebates (such as child care,
housekeeping and donations) are ignored.
T h ee x p e n s e sv a r i a b l ei sd i ﬀerent from the business expenses that can be claimed
in the general set of ﬁnancial accounts. The expenses variable can be deﬁned as ‘fees’
paid for professional services:
• A fee to someone for completing a tax return
• Commission on interest or dividend income
• Expenses incurred in earning income that has had withholding tax deducted
• Additional expenses incurred in earning partnership income, for example, interest
on capital borrowed to purchase a share in the partnership
33• Interest on money borrowed to buy shares or to invest
• Premiums on loss of earnings insurance (income protection), provided the beneﬁt
from the insurance policy is taxable
34Appendix B: Welfare Costs for all Income Tax Brack-
ets
This appendix shows how marginal welfare costs can be obtained for any tax bracket
in a multi-rate system. Suppose that in the th tax bracket the marginal tax rate is
 above the income threshold ,f o r =1 .F o r   +1 the tax paid
at the rate  is simply  ( − ),a n df o r +1 the tax paid at that rate is
 (+1 − ). Hence if  () denotes the distribution function of taxable income, the








Expanding terms, and letting 1 () denote the ﬁrst moment distribution function of
,a n d the total population size:

 = [¯  {1 (+1) − 1 ()} −  { (+1) −  ()}
+(+1 − ){1 −  (+1)}]
(B.2)
where ¯  is the arithmetic mean of the complete distribution of .T h e n u m b e r o f
individuals with income in the th tax bracket, ,i s :
 =  { (+1) −  ()} (B.3)
The number of people with income above the threshold +1,t h a ti s ,t h en u m b e ra b o v e





+1 =  {1 −  (+1)} (B.4)
Furthermore, if ¯  denotes the arithmetic mean of  within the th tax bracket, then:
¯  =
¯  {1 (+1) − 1 ()}
{ (+1) −  ()}
(B.5)
Thus revenue raised by the th rate is:
 =  (¯  − )+
+
+1 (+1 − ) (B.6)












The ﬁrst term is the pure ‘tax rate’ eﬀect while the second term is the ‘tax base’ eﬀect
of the tax rate change. Here:


=  (¯  − )+
+
+1 (+1 − ) (B.8)
Furthermore,









The revenue change thus becomes:














+1 (+1 − ) (B.10)
In considering the welfare change, allowance must be made for the income change
of those above the threshold, +1, though they do not experience a change in their
eﬀective marginal tax rate and there is no excess burden. For those with   +1,
the welfare change is, as obtained above, given by  −. Thus, writing  =
¯ 
(¯ −),
aggregate marginal excess burden, , is similar to the earlier result that:




However, the marginal welfare cost becomes:
 =











¯  − 
¶
(1 − ) (B.13)
and substitution gives:
 =
(1 − )(+1 − ){1 −  (+1)}
¯  {1 (+1) − 1 ()} −  { (+1) −  ()}
(B.14)
36The result for the top marginal rate is thus simply the special case where +1 = ∞
and  (+1)=1 (+1)=1 ,s ot h a t =0 . If, as for example in New Zealand,
there is no tax-free threshold in the income tax structure, so that 1 =0 ,i tc a nb e
seen that 1 =1and 1 =
[(1−1)2{1−(2)}]
{¯ 1(2)} .
Tables 12 and 13 report the various components — other than the elasticity of taxable
income — needed to compute the welfare measures. The tax rates, ,i nT a b l e s1 2a n d
1 3i n c l u d eal o wi n c o m er e b a t e .
37Table 12: Components of Marginal Welfare Costs: 1994—2000
Thresholds    ¯ 
1994
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.12 4,868
9,501-30,875 28 2.16 1.36 17,690
Over 30,875 33 2.44 0.00 52,293
1995
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.13 4,777
9,501-30,875 28 2.15 1.28 17,766
Over 30,875 33 2.35 0.00 53,819
1996
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.14 4,656
9,501-30,875 28 2.13 1.24 17,894
Over 30,875 33 2.34 0.00 54,002
1997 (composite year)
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.23 4,331
9,501-30,875 25 2.19 1.22 17,457
30,876-34,200 26.25 19.84 -1.45 32,515
Over 34,200 33 2.37 0.00 59,187
1998
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.25 4,206
9,501-34,200 24 2.03 1.19 18,682
Over 34,200 33 2.34 0.00 59,768
1999 (composite year)
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.18 4,432
9,501-34,200 21.75 2.05 1.24 18,550
34,201-38,000 24 19.08 -1.29 36,092
Over 38,000 33 2.27 0.00 67,866
2000
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.12 4,409
9,501-38,000 21 1.91 1.18 19,905
Over 38,000 33 2.06 0.00 73,945
38Table 13: Marginal Welfare Cost Components: 2001—2008
Thresholds    ¯    
2001 2002
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.20 4,260 1.00 1.22 3,980
9,501-38,000 21 1.90 1.26 20,108 1.89 1.23 20,214
38,001-60,000 33 5.24 -0.60 46,970 5.19 -0.67 47,080
Over 60,000 39 2.54 0.00 98,871 2.48 0.00 100,475
2003 2004
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.28 3,708 1.00 1.26 3,620
9,501-38,000 21 1.89 1.19 20,209 1.87 1.18 20,405
38,001-60,000 33 5.13 -0.68 47,200 5.11 -0.80 47,248
Over 60,000 39 2.50 0.00 100,014 2.44 0.00 101,562
2005 2006
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.22 3,528 1.00 1.19 3,434
9,501-38,000 21 1.85 1.18 20,617 1.84 1.21 20,786
38,001-60,000 33 5.07 -0.92 47,341 5.02 -1.00 47,460
Over 60,000 39 2.40 0.00 102,977 2.49 0.00 100,321
2007 2008
0-9,500 15 1.00 1.20 3,550 1.00 1.19 3,479
9,501-38,000 21 1.83 1.19 20,966 1.81 1.18 21,239
38,001-60,000 33 5.00 -1.18 47,499 4.93 -1.42 47,676
Over 60,000 39 2.52 0.00 99,381 2.52 0.00 99,466
39Appendix C: Taxable Income Distributions
This appendix provides summary information on the number and percentage of tax-
payers by income and the sum and percentage of taxable income by income band.
Table 14: Taxable Incomes by Income Band: 1994—1998
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Number of Taxpayers by Income Band
0-9,000 829,840 758,388 742,790 725,388 717,600
9,001-38,000 1,571,680 1,660,907 1,672,044 1,702,448 1,704,142
38,001-60,000 255,160 263,632 288,742 313,405 329,214
Over 60,000 104,320 119,043 132,356 146,923 156,408
Total 2,761,000 2,801,970 2,835,932 2,888,164 2,907,364
Percentage of Taxpayers by Income Band
0-9,000 30 27 26 25 25
9,001-38,000 57 59 59 59 59
38,001-60,000 9 9 10 11 11
O v e r 6 0 , 0 0 0 4455 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sum of Taxable Income by Income Band (dollar million)
0-9,000 3,748 3,124 2,987 2,841 2,796
9,001-38,000 30,582 32,037 32,761 33,245 33,541
38,001-60,000 11,744 12,155 13,335 14,498 15,266
Over 60,000 10,738 12,648 13,936 15,521 16,672
Total 56,812 59,964 63,020 66,104 68,275
Percentage of Taxable Income by Income Band
0-9,000 7 5 5 4 4
9,001-38,000 54 53 52 50 49
38,001-60,000 21 20 21 22 22
Over 60,000 19 21 22 23 24
Total 100 100 100 100 100
40Table 15: Taxable Incomes by Income Band: 1999—2003
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of Taxpayers by Income Band
0-9,000 689,783 692,240 704,370 698,960 689,490
9,001-38,000 1,681,660 1,699,910 1,715,080 1,718,650 1,735,260
38,001-60,000 341,990 357,870 399,100 437,230 470,910
Over 60,000 173,585 187,560 193,550 221,251 236,661
Total 2,887,018 2,937,580 3,012,100 3,076,091 3,132,321
Percentage of Taxpayers by Income Band
0-9,000 24 24 23 23 22
9,001-38,000 58 58 57 56 55
38,001-60,000 12 12 13 14 15
O v e r 6 0 , 0 0 0 6667 8
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sum of Taxable Income by Income Band (dollar million)
0-9,000 2,647 2,613 2,593 2,457 2,368
9,001-38,000 32,538 32,881 33,604 34,084 34,700
38,001-60,000 15,881 16,648 18,748 20,588 22,230
Over 60,000 19,111 23,685 19,139 22,238 23,676
Total 70,178 75,828 74,085 79,367 82,974
Percentage of Taxable Income by Income Band
0-9,000 4 3 4 3 3
9,001-38,000 46 43 45 43 42
38,001-60,000 23 22 25 26 27
Over 60,000 27 31 26 28 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100
41Table 16: Taxable Incomes by Income Band: 2004—2008
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of Taxpayers by Income Band
0-9,000 686,000 692,670 706,130 677,140 651,920
9,001-38,000 1,718,580 1,712,800 1,694,770 1,674,030 1,668,720
38,001-60,000 509,780 547,840 582,430 614,790 649,690
Over 60,000 277,141 312,971 352,881 400,711 453,091
Total 3,191,501 3,266,281 3,336,211 3,366,671 3,423,421
Percentage of Taxpayers by Income Band
0-9,000 21 21 21 20 19
9,001-38,000 54 52 51 50 49
38,001-60,000 16 17 17 18 19
O v e r 6 0 , 0 0 0 91 01 11 2 1 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sum of Taxable Income by Income Band (dollar million)
0-9,000 2,339 2,288 2,277 2,261 2,066
9,001-38,000 34,787 35,007 34,937 34,807 35,018
38,001-60,000 24,089 25,938 27,645 29,204 30,977
Over 60,000 28,151 32,233 35,406 39,826 45,071
Total 89,367 95,466 100,265 106,099 113,131
Percentage of Taxable Income by Income Band
0-9,000 3 2 2 2 2
9,001-38,000 39 37 35 33 31
38,001-60,000 27 27 28 28 27
Over 60,000 32 34 35 38 40
Total 100 100 100 100 100
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